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EXPLICATION DU TEXTE:  “I’M AN 
ORIGINALIST; I’M A TEXTUALIST; I’M NOT A 
NUT”  
D. A. Jeremy Telman* 
Justice Antonin Scalia frequently reminded people of his position as a 
self-described “faint-hearted” originalist:1 “I’m an originalist; I’m a 
textualist; I’m not a nut,” he often remarked.2  The statement epitomizes 
Justice Scalia’s uniqueness among our Supreme Court Justices.  He was as 
much a showman as a jurist.  He knew how to speak to the bench and the 
bar and to the far broader audiences that he alone among his colleagues 
was particularly skilled at reaching.  The statement was classic Justice 
Scalia because in ten words he managed to appeal simultaneously to three 
very distinct audiences. 
I. 
“I’m an originalist” in itself is a show-stopper for some audiences 
before which Justice Scalia regularly appeared.  The profession of belief 
could stand alone and elicit a standing ovation from the Federalist Society 
or from a meeting of the Tea Party, coming as it did from a sitting Supreme 
Court Justice.  In those contexts, Justice Scalia’s embrace of originalism 
was a valuable shorthand expression that stood for a relatively simple but 
powerful political and jurisprudential agenda.  People on both sides of the 
originalism/living constitutionalism divide agree that originalism arose 
in response to the perceived activism of the Warren and Burger Courts.  
To proclaim one’s originalism is to distance oneself from that tradition of 
liberal jurisprudence.  In that context, originalism is about judicial 
modesty, about fidelity to a literal reading of the constitutional text, and 
in particular it is about hostility to expansions of unenumerated 
individual rights, such as the right to privacy. 
Justice Scalia stressed his originalism because he knew how important 
it was to certain constituencies to hear someone in a position of power 
embrace their political agenda.  Justice Scalia could forthrightly proclaim 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School.  The author is at work on a book-
length history of originalism in constitutional interpretation with the working title 
Originalism and Its Discontents.  A related article on Justice Scalia’s originalism, Originalism: 
A Thing Worth Doing . . .  is forthcoming in the Ohio Northern Law Review. 
1 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
2 Jeffrey Rosen, What Made Scalia Great?, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/what-made-antonin-scalia-great/ 
462837/ [https://perma.cc/5NGB-GRFY]; Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, 
Opens Up, NPR (May 8, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=89986017 [https://perma.cc/2NXQ-TB2W]. 
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his originalism.  He need not stress the faint-heartedness of that 
originalism, as doing so would only call into question the authenticity of 
his originalism before the very constituencies who so valued his 
adherence to the originalist faith. 
II. 
When Justice Scalia added, “I’m a textualist,” he was addressing and 
appealing to a different audience, although of course there is always some 
overlap.  The embrace of originalism sends a clear message; the embrace 
of textualism is far more technical, and it is hard to imagine that textualism 
could become the political rallying cry that originalism has been for some 
time. Justice Scalia’s invocation of textualism is directed at the legal 
academy and the small clerisy of constitutional litigators and adjudicators 
who practice or espouse this very particular approach to legal 
interpretation. 
Justice Scalia’s textualism stands for two distinct ideas.  First, 
textualism is Justice Scalia’s great contribution to the theory of originalism 
in constitutional interpretation, but many adherents of popular 
constitutionalism do not know it, and they might not agree with Justice 
Scalia if they did.  Early originalists argued that judges, in interpreting the 
Constitution, needed to be faithful to the original intentions of the Framers.  
The Constitution ought to mean what, for example, James Madison 
thought it meant.  By the mid-1980s, legal scholars had largely discredited 
originalist intentionalism.  They did so by pointing out just how difficult 
it is to know the intentions of the dozens of men involved in drafting the 
Constitution and, what matters more, the 1800 men at state ratification 
conventions who actually voted to make it law.  In addition, legal scholars 
showed that the Framers themselves did not intend for future generations 
to be bound by their subjective understandings of the text they had helped 
to create. 
But Justice Scalia pointed out that originalists need not be faithful to 
original intentions; it suffices that they be faithful to the constitutional text, 
as its intended late eighteenth-century audience would have understood 
it.  That textual meaning is what binds us and what constrains judges and 
other lawmakers. 
The other idea summed up in the word “textualism” is Justice Scalia’s 
fabled hostility to resort to legislative history in the interpretation of legal 
texts.  Memorials to Justice Scalia proclaim that this textualism is Justice 
Scalia’s great legacy to our legal culture.  I have not seen any empirical 
studies to this effect, and I do not know if such a study is possible, but 
some legal scholars credit Justice Scalia with a significant reduction in 
judges’ resort to legislative history.  I suspect that here as elsewhere, 
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Justice Scalia’s main impact has been rhetorical.  Where texts are clear and 
unambiguous, textualism suffices to resolve legal controversies.  But in 
most cases, legal texts are subject to various interpretations, and so a resort 
to extrinsic evidence is called for.   Even the great textualist, Justice 
Antonin Scalia would not ignore legislative history in the service of textual 
interpretation. 
III. 
Justice Scalia addressed a popular audience when he said “I’m an 
originalist,” and he addressed a scholarly audience when he said “I’m a 
textualist.”  When he said “I’m not a nut,” he was addressing his critics 
and his colleagues on the U.S. Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia was not a nut 
because he remained true to the originalist credo of judicial modesty.  
Judges are constrained, not only by the constitutional text but also by 
precedent.  There may arise times when a strict originalism would lead to 
an outcome at odds with settled legal expectations.  On such occasions, 
principle must bow to reality.  So, for example, Justice Scalia is 
comfortable with the precedent established by the Court’s ruling in Brown 
v. Board of Education, despite the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
originally understood, permitted segregated schools.  Similarly, he seems 
to have acquiesced in the application of the Equal Protection doctrine to 
“discrete and insular minorities,” in myriad ways that those groups were 
not accorded equal protection of law at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption. 
One would expect that Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted originalism 
would remain sufficiently robust as to resist the expansion of suspect legal 
doctrines.  That has not always proved to be the case.  Although 
substantive due process is the doctrine at the heart of the liberal judicial 
activism that originalism so abhors, Justice Scalia was willing to embrace 
the doctrine in his separate concurring opinion in McDonald.3  Justice 
Thomas, a less “faint-hearted” originalist than Justice Scalia, wrote 
separately in McDonald, voicing his unwillingness to accept the grounding 
of a substantive right in a constitutional provision that speaks only to 
process.4 
There are many other occasions on which the two originalist Justices 
have parted ways, and that is why Justice Scalia’s credo: originalist, 
textualist, nut is so powerful.  He draws us in with his appeal to 
                                                 
3 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have 
acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights ‘because it 
is both long established and narrowly limited.’’’) (internal citation omitted). 
4 Id. at 806–07 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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originalism; he embraces us with his textualism, and then he repels, with 
the pithy rhetorical force that few could rival, by decrying as a “nut” 
anyone so benighted as to stand on the principles of originalism and 
textualism alone. 
When a great jurist dies, it is tempting to reduce his legacy to one thing 
or to some coherent constellation or related ideas.  And so the fight over 
the true Justice Scalia begins.  Despite his appeal to originalist principle, it 
is very difficult to find cases in which Justice Scalia’s originalism trumped 
his political instincts.  Justice Scalia himself liked to point to the flag-
burning case5 as the counter-example, and others never tire of suggesting 
that we ought to be surprised that the “conservative” Justice Scalia sided 
with criminal defendants in many cases.  Justice Scalia’s political instincts 
do not all resolve into conservatism, but certainly a libertarian sensibility 
informed his sympathetic response to criminal defendants and, yes, even 
to flag-burning hippies, whose rights the government was seeking to 
further curtail.  
                                                 
5 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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